Key issues
2.1
The retail sale of legal tobacco products is a lawful economic activity. However, the committee received evidence that high levels of federal
and state regulation are impeding business and leading to adverse outcomes that
particularly affect small retailers. This chapter examines some of the issues
raised in that evidence, including reduced sales and loss of market share, with
consequent impacts on the viability of small businesses.
Impact of tobacco regulation on small business
2.2
The National Retail Association told the committee that there is an
'excessive red tape burden on retailers in each state' that has added 'real
complexity to a category that isn't warranted'.[1]
According to the National Retail Association, for retailers operating within
and between jurisdictions, the complex and sometimes inconsistent
regulation has created an onerous compliance burden. As one retailer told its
representative body, 'I feel like I'm in the business of compliance and I
do a little bit of retailing on the side'.[2]
2.3
MGA Independent Retailers (MGA) said that the high level of regulation is
a disincentive to tobacco retailers, who are burdened in the day-to-day
operation of their businesses:
A substantial number of MGA members in the independent
supermarket and liquor sector have been adversely affected by the imposition on
them of many tobacco sales regulations that have become an unnecessary burden
in their day to day business operations...Such barriers to the freedom to do
business without restrictions acts as a disincentive, particularly for small
business owners, and also has the added disadvantage of driving an element of
criminality into an industry that previously traded without fear of any such
impediment.[3]
2.4
The Australian Lottery and Newsagents' Association also expressed
concern at regulation that complicates business operations and which exposes
employees to higher levels of risk through inadvertent non-compliance:
Tobacco is often the category where this occurs through
regulatory interventions across multiple jurisdictions. These create further
uncertainty and onerous difficult new obligations for our members and their
staff to navigate. This increases risk for them and inequitably impacts member
small businesses.[4]
Variation in regulation
2.5
The National Retail Association observed that national retailers
must comply with multiple regulatory regimes that differ with respect to signage,
storage, licensing, ticketing, definitions of tobacco products, and sales to
minors.[5]
Sands Fourth Estate Pty Ltd referred specifically to the absence of
standard regulations for price boards, highlighting the importance of the information
presented thereon:
...there is no standard size price board between all the
states. Each state has [its] own size requirements. The price board is the only
visual way to retail tobacco products to customers. When it is small, it is
hard for the customers to select tobacco products...customers are extremely
price conscious. They rely on the price board to determine the cheapest and
best value tobacco products. The size of the price board also makes it very
difficult to display all the prices of all the products. This means customers
are asking for the prices of products that are not on display. This requires us
retailers to look up the price in a folder or in the computer which means it
adds to time and labour costs.[6]
2.6
In another example, submitters and witnesses stated that there is
variance across jurisdictions in the number of cash registers from which an
outlet can sell tobacco products. The National Retail Association considered
New South Wales to be the worst example of this red tape, as that state only allows
for a single point of sale at each outlet: 'This impacts retailers' ability to
serve their customers in an efficient manner...it often forces customers to wait
in a queue for no good reason'.[7]
Effect on customer service
2.7
Among the many regulations, submitters and witnesses argued that the
efficacy of tobacco retail is most affected by plain packaging and display bans.
Jos de Bruin, Chief Executive Officer from MGA, said that these two measures
made it difficult to expeditiously serve customers, which can create
staff/customer tension:
The 'going dark', if you like, displays were rolled out by
individual states...it has made it more difficult to serve customers. Being dark,
you do not know where certain tobacco products are located. You then have to
find them, and of course you are limited to how long that door can be opened,
because you are not allowed to display the tobacco inadvertently. Then, since
plain tobacco packaging...that has made it even more problematic, because we are
actually slowing our service to customers, which is annoying them, and
consequently we do have disgruntled customers, and at times we are at risk of
losing them to other businesses.[8]
2.8
According to Cignall Specialist Tobacconist, plain packaging has also
had a more general effect on business operations:
Retailers for the past five years have had to use additional
resources through both time and staffing as it has become more difficult to
place an order or unpack a delivery and check against the invoice, purely
because it is hard to see the brand/variant of each item. This leads to higher
error rates for suppliers, distributors and retailers when dealing with tobacco
products.[9]
Compliance costs
2.9
Most submitters and witnesses said that federal and state regulation
imposes significant and expensive compliance costs on tobacco retailers. Much of
this cost arises from the inability to readily identify specific products. For example, Sands Fourth Estate Pty Ltd estimated
that it takes about 30 per cent extra time to unpack/check stock at the time of
delivery, and the same amount of time to sequentially store tobacco products
ready for customers:
[Still] it takes longer to find the requested products for
customers. The size of the price board and the plain packaging adds
approximately 40% to time and labour costs.[10]
2.10
MGA said that the inability to readily identify tobacco products has
also increased the incidence and cost of 'shrinkage':
The introduction of plain packaging has also resulted in a
higher number of incorrect products being provided to customers. This has
increased levels of shrinkage where customers have received a higher valued product
for the incorrect monetary sum and resulted in an increase in returned
products, where customers have returned an incorrectly provided product, often
making it unable to be resold. It is difficult to quantify these losses in
financial terms.[11]
2.11
Submitters identified fitout—such as display cabinets, registers and
database upgrades—as another area in which tobacco retailers incur significant
compliance costs.[12]
MGA said, for example:
The imposition of removing smoking products from view has
imposed a cost burden on retailers who have been required in many cases to
reconfigure the front end and point of sale sections of their stores and
retrain staff at a considerable expense...The training of staff not only comes
at a significant wages cost to our stores, but also creates a noteworthy
rostering disadvantage, removing staff from other areas of the store where they
are often required.[13]
2.12
Wick and Wire Co provided similar evidence in relation to its small (vaping)
business, which will shortly come within the ambit of Victoria's tobacco
legislation:
I estimate that I will now need to spend per store a further:
-
up to $30,000 on custom lockable cabinetry including new displays that
fall into the 4 square meters per store currently allocated. With over 1000
items in store we require a large amount of lockable storage to comply
-
up to $18,000 in wages for specialty trainers to retrain staff
-
up to $15,000 in contractor costs for between 150–200 hours per store
spent reconfiguring stores to come up to compliance
-
$2000 in costs to frost windows so that products are not available to be
seen by the public from the outside
-
$2000 in costs to move existing security cameras, to allow for viewing
around frosted areas
-
$4000 in costs to reconfigure existing menus into signboards &
digitized versions
-
$1500 in costs for additional signage to the stores and covering up
existing cabinetry.[14]
Themes in the regulation of tobacco retail
2.13
This section of chapter two examines the following themes in the
regulation of tobacco retail: impact on small to medium enterprises; trade in
illicit tobacco; government revenue; and ability to retail alternative nicotine
delivery systems.
2.14
Submitters and witnesses supported public health objectives but
questioned whether retail regulation effectively targets tobacco smoking. For example, the Australasian Association of Convenience
Stores Limited said that 'no reduction
in smoking can be attributed to the plain packaging laws'.[15]
2.15
The Australian Lottery and Newsagents' Association argued that there
should be evidence-based outcomes to justify the regulatory burden on small
businesses:
...our members operate in a strictly regulated and controlled
environment in relation to the sale of tobacco products...They incur significant
and expensive time and management burdens in their businesses already to ensure
tobacco products sold are all in plain packaging, that tobacco products are
kept out of sight behind closed doors, that relevant signage is posted, and,
most importantly, that tobacco products are not sold to anyone under the age of
18. The trade-off for these economic burdens born [sic] by small businesses
like our members should be a societal outcome that demonstrably reduces the
harmful effects of smoking in our community, while not unfairly or unnecessarily
impacting the health, safety and economic opportunities available to our
members.[16]
Impact on small to medium
enterprises
2.16
Some peak bodies expressed the view that the regulation of tobacco
retail disproportionately impacts small business and impedes fair competition. In particular,
the Australian Lottery and Newsagents' Association submitted:
Fair competition means a just, open, and equitable
competition between business competitors. By way of comparison, the major
retailers have considerably more resources and scale with which to incorporate
new compliance costs and process structures, therefore these need to be more
carefully designed so as not to have the effect of inequitably impacting small
businesses more than their competitors.[17]
2.17
Ben Kearney from the Australian Lottery and Newsagents' Association
provided the following example of a regulation that impacts smaller retailers
more so than larger retailers:
...an example is the flat tobacco licence fee in Tasmania,
which will reach $1,097 next January [from $306] and which is starting to have
the effect of many of our smaller retailers indicating that they will leave the
tobacco category. This policy will likely result in gifting this category to
the major retailers over time, which is an inequitable approach and
unquestionably unfair for our small retailers.[18]
2.18
In another example, the committee heard that over-regulation through
duty rate increases particularly affects small businesses. CTC Tanilba Bay
indicated that small businesses are consequently becoming less viable:
The ever increasing tax on tobacco products is becoming a
blatant money grab...The impact is becoming ever more present in our industry as
businesses are being forced to reduce trading hours and reduce margins which is
leading to fewer hours for staff and less employment opportunities as overheads
increase and profits go down.[19]
2.19
The committee heard that tobacco products are an important retail item
for many businesses.[20]
The Australian Lottery and Newsagents' Association said that these products
provide 'an important share of revenue and staff hours in many small businesses',
in addition to encouraging sales of higher margin products.[21]
A representative from the Australasian Association of Convenience Stores
Limited estimated revenue at 38 per cent on average of its members' sales:
It can be up to 40 per cent or greater, but on average it is
about 38 per cent, and it has been that figure for many years. Importantly, it
is about 25 per cent of a typical store's profitability or their margin...without
tobacco, many of those retailers are at risk of going broke.[22]
Trade in illicit tobacco
2.20
Overwhelmingly, submitters and witnesses expressed concern at the trade
in illicit tobacco, arguing that regulation (including
taxation) is increasing the cost of legal products, thereby leading customers to
purchase cheaper illegal products.[23]
Cristie Bowler, National Operations Manager for Cignall Specialist Tobacconist,
said:
Every time there is a price increase consumers are not ready to
give up smoking, but what we are seeing is that they have reached a tipping
point. Everyone has a unique tipping point where they are not prepared to pay
that price any more, and that is when they move to the illicit trade.[24]
2.21
Imperial Tobacco Australia agreed that restricting supply (through price,
tax or other measures) will not reduce demand for tobacco products. Instead,
consumers will look to other sources:
The concept that curtailing supply automatically cancels
demand is both logically and factually absurd. Prohibition of alcohol in the
United States (and in Russia and Scandinavia) famously didn't work. The
achievement of excess tobacco regulation has been to remove the free choice of
adult consumers and to increase the demand for illicit tobacco. Demand is not
affected by a reduction in one channel of supply. Consumers simply search
either for a new method of supply or, more likely, avail themselves of an
existing alternative.[25]
2.22
Jos de Bruin (MGA) highlighted that the loss of trade adversely affects tobacco
retailers' legal sales:
A number of our members have already complained that their
sales year‑on‑year are down not because the consumer is smoking
less or using tobacco products less; they are actually buying illicit tobacco
from other sources. You can buy 100 sticks for $30 or you can buy chop-chop.[26]
2.23
Submitters and witnesses told the committee that the increased cost of
legal tobacco products has also resulted in criminal elements increasingly
targeting retail outlets.[27]
Although data appears difficult to obtain, anecdotally there is a rising
incidence of tobacco-related crime. Cignall Specialist Tobacconist submitted,
for example:
Many stores have been victim to burglaries either at night or
assault and robberies during the day, due to the high cost of tobacco products
and the ease [with] which you can move this stolen product. Retailers have had
to spend thousands of dollars increasing security in their stores, while
thieves continue to become either more creative or more aggressive.[28]
2.24
Jeff Rogut, Chief Executive Officer of the Australasian Association of
Convenience Stores Limited, illustrated the problem among its members:
I do have one example that I called for—just to get a
snapshot—from one retailer, who is reasonably organised. In the last four years—and
they run just over 100 stores—they have lost about $50,000 worth of tobacco to
robberies. Whilst the robbery, of itself, is an issue, and the tobacco is an
issue, the bigger issue is the people and the trauma that is being caused to
staff in these stores. Most of our stores trade 24 hours, so we do not really
have as much happening with the ram raids. What we are seeing is the huge costs
that retailers are putting in for security. That is for personal alarms,
reinforcing glass and lockable doors. They are now putting fog or smoke devices
in the stores that envelop the store in smoke if they are attacked and robbed.
That on its own cost about $7½ thousand. But, to protect their people and their
customers, it is a cost that our members are actually investing in their
businesses.[29]
2.25
In addition to heightened security costs and issues, the committee heard
that it is increasingly difficult for tobacco retailers to obtain insurance
that covers the theft of tobacco stock. Jos de Bruin said that insurance costs
are higher and stock levels are subject to caps.[30]
However, Cristie Bowler from Cignall Specialist Tobacconist indicated that it
might not always even be possible to get insurance:
Every company is different. We are finding that a lot of
underwriters will not touch tobacco as we are dealing with certain insurance
companies. They have had to then search for other underwriters. This is only
going on their hearsay. But every time we try to get an insurance policy for
stores it becomes very difficult.[31]
Government response to the illicit
trade
2.26
Submitters and witnesses expressed frustration with the Australian Government's
commitment to tackling the trade in illicit tobacco.[32]
Sami Hakim from Imperial Tobacco Australia indicated that the Department of
Immigration and Border Protection had 'cracked down' on importers but 'the
retail end of the equation has not seen significant or sufficient attention'.[33]
Jeff Rogut agreed, saying 'Yes, Border Force do a terrific job at the border,
but it is not happening at street level'.[34]
2.27
The committee heard that prohibitions on the retailing of illicit
tobacco are not being enforced. Jeff Rogut suggested this might be due to
confusion about responsibilities:
...our members will put up actual addresses of where they know
this product is being sold, and there is very little action, because Border
Force suggests that it is a Victoria Police issue, just using that as an
example. Victoria Police say it is a Department of Health issue...There just
seems to be total confusion in terms of who should be policing it. So, where
our retailers will be mystery shopped to make sure they are not selling to
underage kids, the fines are enormous for selling one packet of product that is
not in a plain pack—$220,000. I have not seen one retailer, one market
operator, receive such a fine. So I think it is farcical on the ground to say
that enforcement is working. It is not.[35]
2.28
Cristie Bowler shared a view that government departments and agencies
simply don't want to take responsibility for enforcing tobacco legislation, and
retailers of illicit tobacco are acting with impunity:
...there is no responsibility with regard to penalties. Retailers
[of illicit tobacco] are openly selling this anywhere and everywhere, but
no-one wants to know. We have raised it with police, councils, the health
department and the [Australian Taxation Office]. No-one wants to take
responsibility. It seems to be that, although there are penalties in the
legislation, we do not see anyone being penalised for selling this product. Retailers
are very frustrated, because they are the ones doing the correct thing.[36]
2.29
Andrew Gregson from Imperial Tobacco Australia described a specific
proposal from the tobacco industry to boycott these 'retailers who [are] doing
the wrong thing':
One of the key factors of the illicit tobacco market in
Australia is that, to a significant extent, it is embedded within the legal
supply chain and it is not particularly difficult to buy...This measure we
proposed would not be the silver bullet to solve illicit tobacco, but it would
seriously impact the retail side of the equation. It would stop those retailers
who are currently operating both a legitimate and an illegitimate business from
doing so. They would need to choose, and it is pretty obvious which side
they would choose.[37]
2.30
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission rejected the proposal,
on the basis of competition concerns, in a draft determination issued in
December 2016.[38]
Imperial Tobacco Australia emphatically denied that the proposal is attempted
collusion aimed at enhancing its proponents' market share (already in excess of
95 per cent). Andrew Gregson said:
...in this instance our interests and those of the public
health agencies, including the health department, are aligned. It is their job
to oversee the plain packaging legislation. It is their job to tackle illicit
tobacco, and they are, in our opinion, spiking an opportunity to do it by
removing it from the legitimate tobacco trade.[39]
2.31
Imperial Tobacco Australia suggested that the Department of Health does
not consider illicit tobacco to be a serious problem in Australia. However, 'there
are no reports of which we are aware that say illicit tobacco in Australia sits
at zero. Clearly it does not'.[40]
Government revenue
2.32
The tobacco industry is a significant contributor to government revenue.
In 2016–2017, tobacco excise and customs duty is expected to amount to $10.16
billion.[41]
Submitters—such as Imperial Tobacco Australia and the Australasian Association
of Convenience Stores Limited—highlighted that the industry contributes also
through the payment of other taxes and through its employment of Australian
workers.[42]
2.33
In contrast, illicit tobacco sales could account for as much as 14.0 per
cent of total tobacco consumption (equivalent to an additional $1.49 billion in
revenue).[43]
2.34
The Australasian Association of Convenience Stores Limited commented on this
'lost' revenue, stating that it is in the Australian Government's
interests to enforce tobacco legislation and to support small businesses that
retail legal tobacco products, thereby providing employment and contributing in
the form of taxes.[44]
Refund of duty (drawback)
2.35
Imperial Tobacco Australia raised a specific issue related to tobacco
control measures. Its submission identified refund of duty (drawback) as a
specific area of red tape involving a 'complex, burdensome and redundant'
process that incurs unnecessary business costs.[45]
2.36
Imperial Tobacco Australia stated that a measure temporarily introduced
by Customs Amendment Regulation 2012 (No. 8)—to simplify the drawback
process—was 'extremely effective and praised by government officials and the
industry'.[46]
Imperial Tobacco Australia (ITA) argued that the unnecessary red tape should be
eliminated with the permanent re-introduction of this measure:
Making the process permanently available is a relatively
straightforward task, carries demonstrable benefits for government, Australian
businesses, the environment and the Australian public. ITA understands that
there is cross-party support for the measure.[47]
2.37
Andrew Gregson speculated that the reason for the continued existence of
this example of red tape is due to antipathy toward the tobacco industry:
Let's face it: we are the tobacco industry. Taking up any
sorts of cudgels for the tobacco industry rarely provides you with a great deal
of public exuberance...by the same token, for governments or indeed parliaments
that are serious about removing red tape, this is one that can be done swiftly
and efficiently and...without any opposition whatsoever.[48]
Inability to retail alternative nicotine
delivery systems
2.38
Submitters and witness expressed concern at the inability of tobacco
retailers to sell alternative nicotine delivery systems (such as e-cigarettes).[49]
In Australia, the manufacture, sale or supply of liquid nicotine is
prohibited in all jurisdictions, meaning that e-cigarettes cannot be sold in
any state or territory.[50]
2.39
Philip Morris Limited submitted that this approach actually promotes
harmful outcomes for Australian consumers:
...we cannot introduce smoke-free alternatives and Australian
retailers cannot make them available to their customers due to government
regulation, meaning the policy environment overseen by the Department of Health
protects and comparatively promotes only the most harmful products in this
category.[51]
2.40
Professor Sinclair Davidson concurred: 'in what must be one of the
greatest public health failures of all time, harm reduction in Australia is
prohibited'.[52]
2.41
The Australian Lottery and Newsagents' Association submitted that the
Australian approach is not good regulatory practice and that, consistent with
international practice, Australia should look to develop better regulation of e‑cigarettes:
...the approach to restrictions on electronic cigarettes is
inconsistent with good regulation and...more available evidence should be considered
regarding developing more reliable regulation of e-cigarettes. Approaches in
other countries, like [New Zealand] and Canada, who are legalising nicotine e‑cigarettes
must also be looked at carefully and retailers should not be unfairly
restricted.[53]
2.42
Phillip Morris noted Article 1 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control,[54]
suggesting that Australia is obliged to support the development and sale of
'reduced-risk products'.[55]
However, e-cigarette red tape remains the product of an outdated and
inappropriate regulatory scheme:
This sort of red tape directly denies the opportunity for
tobacco retailers to sell less harmful products, while, in practice, it leaves
the market open to companies who are overseas and who can sell e-cigarette
style products without complying with local laws and product standards or
paying tax. Indeed, it drives retailers out of Australia to set up offshore. It
is influenced and driven by the inadequacies of a system designed decades ago
to regulate only therapeutic goods or cigarettes, as well as the current
approach and attitude of regulators.[56]
Importation of nicotine
2.43
Individuals can import nicotine into Australia for use as an unapproved
therapeutic good (such a smoking cessation aid). One import condition is that
the individual must hold a prescription from a registered medical practitioner.[57]
However, Mark Powell said that most Australians using 'reduced‑risk
products' do not satisfy this condition:
...it is highly unlikely that the vast majority of those people
have a prescription—even under current law there is a huge illicit market in e‑cigarettes
and reduced-risk products—the people who are opting out of smoking or quitting
smoking and are finding a way to do so are breaking the law to save their own
lives. That is the situation that we have right now. As New Zealand and other
countries increase the availability and regulation of these products, that
problem is going to get much, much worse.[58]
2.44
The committee heard that customers are interested in purchasing alternative
nicotine delivery systems from tobacco retailers.[59]
Concurrently, Jeff Rogut advised that small businesses could see opportunities
in retailing these products: 'if you are looking at expanding the business or
sustainability of the category, it certainly is a very viable alternative'.[60]
Achievement of public health
objectives
2.45
The National Tobacco Strategy 2012–2018 (NTS), policy frameworks
and tobacco control measures are directed at achieving public health
objectives.[61]
However, submitters contended that these objectives are not supported by the
current approach to nicotine. Professor Davidson referenced the International
Journal of Drug Policy in which a recent editorial stated:
Although nicotine is the addictive ingredient in tobacco, the
well‑documented harms associated with smoking stem from the carcinogens
and gases in cigarette smoke rather than nicotine itself. Nicotine does not
impair consciousness in the manner of other licit and illicit drugs; indeed, it
often enhances it. For these reasons, it is perhaps the clearest instance of a
drug where the 'delivery system' (the cigarette) rather than the drug itself causes
harm. In light of the distinctive attributes of tobacco and nicotine, harm reduction
approaches–in the form of safer nicotine delivery systems–would appear to have
a lot to offer tobacco control and public health.[62]
2.46
Similar to the licit/illicit tobacco market, Professor Davidson said
that consumers will turn to illicit sources of nicotine if it cannot be
lawfully supplied:
If consumers are unable to satisfy their demand for nicotine
from the extant industry they will simply satisfy their demand from other
(non-legal) sources. There are excellent reasons why it is preferable that consumers
purchase their nicotine (in whatever form) from legal industry sources rather
than illegal sources.[63]
2.47
Some submitters and witnesses speculated about policy makers' aversion
to alternative nicotine delivery systems, concluding that there is ideological
opposition to the tobacco industry that surpasses all arguments based on public
health objectives. For example, Professor Davidson submitted:
...the anti-tobacco lobby specifically does not want to pursue
harm reduction strategies as they perceive that this will not result in an end
to smoking and that it will not result in the end of the tobacco industry. That ideological
choice–and a hatred of the industry itself–leads to individuals continuing to
consume nicotine in harmful ways and imposing large health costs upon themselves
and the public health system.[64]
2.48
Mark Powell from Philip Morris Limited agreed that tobacco policy may be
too focussed on combatting tobacco companies:
...the very influential actors in Australia—people within
tobacco control within the department of health and particular tobacco control
advocates—have been very passionate about the fact that they think they are
winning a war and suggest to you that their focus is on combating tobacco.
Perhaps more appropriately, they would consider themselves, really, to be
combating tobacco companies rather than actually supporting public health...it is
an ideological fixed position.[65]
2.49
Alternatively, the Australasian Association of Convenience Stores Limited
appeared to question the underlying objective of tobacco control measures,
stating that the 'actual main purpose' of regulation is not to achieve a
reduction in smoking behaviours but to increase government revenue.[66]
Regulatory framework for
alternative nicotine delivery systems
2.50
Several submitters and witnesses told the committee that retailers need
a regulatory framework for the sale of alternative nicotine delivery systems.
Based on national and international growth in e-cigarettes, the Australasian
Association of Convenience Stores Limited stated that 'the development of an
appropriate legal framework for the sale of these products cannot be delayed'.[67]
Mark Powell added that, commensurate with overseas jurisdictions, such a framework
should be risk‑based:
...it would be appropriate to set up an entirely new system of
regulation...The far better way of looking at this would be to say: 'Look, these
products are different. These are not cigarettes. They are a new category.' We
would propose...that it would be regulated on the basis of the risk of the product...That
is the basis on which tobacco control regulation has been established to date...These
reduced-harm products—or what we at Philip Morris call reduced-risk products—are
being regulated around the world with a much lighter hand that is appropriate to
the risk of those products. It is just Australia, it would seem, that is not
even looking at this approach.[68]
2.51
Philip Buisson, Chief Executive Office of Soulblu, emphasised that e‑cigarettes
should be treated distinct from tobacco products, particularly by enabling
product advertising and promotion based on health objectives:
...we have been grouped as a tobacco product and are not seen
as an alternative and as a direct competitor against tobacco. Being ruled as
tobacco has now limited all the good news that we can share with customers who
are smoking and who are addicted. If there is a study saying that electronic
cigarettes are far safer than tobacco cigarettes, it cannot be advertised. We
may no longer help a customer who is looking for a safer method of nicotine
delivery, or non-nicotine delivery, and we will not be able to help that person
make an informed choice. So, therefore, we cannot release publicly any
scientific evidence. We will not be able to advise a person on which electronic
cigarette they should take. Keep in mind that these are electronic vaporisers;
they vaporise a liquid. The only content that can link them to tobacco is
nicotine.[69]
2.52
Professor Davidson agreed that tobacco and nicotine products are not the
same, and each should have their own regulatory framework:
To the extent that it is now widely accepted that the health
risks associated with, say, electronic cigarettes are much lower than
combustible cigarettes it is clear that regulating the two products (delivery
technologies) in a like manner would be inappropriate. This regulatory approach
would not benefit nicotine consumers, nor contribute to government revenue, nor
would it target harm...The primary role of regulation should be to target harm.[70]
2.53
E-cigarette retailers strongly supported the creation of a new
regulatory framework for e-cigarettes. Philip Buisson highlighted that
e-cigarettes do not always contain nicotine:
...the action of smoking has been demonised...the action of
e-cigarettes, and what they produce, has also been demonised. All of a sudden,
they have been classed as a tobacco product when they are actually a product of
propylene glycol, vegetable glycerine, nicotine at times, and
food flavouring. These liquids are heated to evaporation point, they are
inhaled, and it seems like smoking.[71]
2.54
Wick and Wire Co, whose business primarily involves retailing
e-cigarettes, similarly argued that its products are not in the same category
as tobacco products: 'The products that we sell do not contain tobacco,
nicotine or any of the other 6000+ chemicals that cigarettes contain'.[72]
2.55
In these circumstances, the committee is not clear why e‑cigarettes
are being regulated similarly to tobacco products in some jurisdictions.
Committee view
2.56
Throughout the tobacco inquiry, the committee received substantial
evidence of high levels of regulation that adversely affect small businesses which
retail legal products. It is the committee's view that a market operates most
efficiently when there is limited regulation which has clearly identified policy
objectives—such as those connected to public health. The committee recommends
that all governments review their tobacco control measures and identify
opportunities to refocus it and reduce the red tape burden on small retailers.
2.57
The committee heard that some tobacco control measures are not
achieving, and are not likely to achieve, evidence-based public health
outcomes. On the contrary, the committee heard that the regulation of tobacco
retailing is preventing Australians from accessing less harmful alternatives to
smoking, having the undesirable and unintended effect of encouraging criminal
activity, while disproportionately affecting employees, employers and
businesses that contribute to the national economy. The committee
recommends that, in any review of tobacco retail regulation, non-evidence based
regulation is identified and eliminated.
2.58
The committee is concerned that tobacco control measures have provided
some Australians without the choice to legally purchase products that minimise
personal harm. In this regard, the committee notes that the Australian
Government appears to have done very little to 'identify the most appropriate
policy approach' to alternative nicotine delivery systems (Action 6.7.5 of the
NTS). Certainly, no such evidence was provided to the tobacco inquiry.
2.59
In a climate of deregulation and red tape reduction, the committee is reluctant
to recommend the creation of a further regulatory framework. However, the
committee accepts that there are a significant number of consumers who wish to
purchase alternative nicotine delivery systems. Further, this is likely already
occurring without the imprimatur of the law. The committee considers that
lawful retail of such systems in a regulated environment is preferable to black
market or loophole acquisition. The committee is persuaded that all governments
should develop and implement an appropriate framework for alternative nicotine
delivery systems.
2.60
On the periphery of retail regulation, the committee notes concerns
about the drawback process for customs duty on tobacco. On the evidence
received, it is not clear what the rationale is for the re-exportation
requirement that Imperial Tobacco Australia indicated was expensive and
unnecessary red tape. The committee recommends that the Department of
Immigration and Border Protection should provide an explanation that justifies
this requirement, failing which the red tape should be eliminated in a timely
fashion.
2.61
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement is currently
inquiring into illicit tobacco.[73]
The committee looks forward with interest to substantive recommendations that
enable government departments and agencies to combat this trade. In the
interim, the committee suggests that the Department of Health specifically note
comments in this report regarding responsibility for, and enforcement of,
illegal retail activity. As lead agency, the committee expects the Department
of Health, assisted by the National Measurement Institute, to take a visibly
more active role in enforcement activities.
2.62
With these comments in mind the committee makes the following
recommendations:
Recommendation 1
2.63
The committee recommends that Commonwealth, state and territory
governments review their tobacco control measures, with a view to:
-
identifying opportunities to reduce the red tape burden on small
retailers; and
-
identifying and eliminating regulatory measures that are not
evidence‑based.
Recommendation 2
2.64
The committee recommends that Commonwealth, state and territory
governments develop and implement an appropriate framework for alternative
nicotine delivery systems.
Recommendation 3
2.65
The committee recommends that the Department of Immigration and Border
Protection provide an explanation to justify the requirement for re‑exportation
of tobacco products on which drawback is claimed, failing which the requirement
should be eliminated in a timely fashion.
Senator David Leyonhjelm
Chair
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